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Abstract
While face recognition systems got a significant boost
in terms of recognition performance in recent years, they
are known to be vulnerable to presentation attacks. Up to
date, most of the research in the field of face anti-spoofing
or presentation attack detection was considered as a two-
class classification task: features of bona-fide samples ver-
sus features coming from spoofing attempts. The main fo-
cus has been on boosting the anti-spoofing performance for
databases with identical types of attacks across both train-
ing and evaluation subsets. However, in realistic appli-
cations the types of attacks are likely to be unknown, po-
tentially occupying a broad space in the feature domain.
Therefore, a failure to generalize on unseen types of at-
tacks is one of the main potential challenges in existing
anti-spoofing approaches. First, to demonstrate the gen-
eralization issues of two-class anti-spoofing systems we es-
tablish new evaluation protocols for existing publicly avail-
able databases. Second, to unite the data collection efforts
of various institutions we introduce a challenging Aggre-
gated database composed of 3 publicly available datasets:
Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile and MSU MFSD, reporting
the performance on it. Third, considering existing limita-
tions we propose a number of systems approaching a task of
presentation attack detection as an anomaly detection, or a
one-class classification problem, using only bona-fide fea-
tures in the training stage. Using less training data, hence
requiring less effort in the data collection, the introduced
approach demonstrates a better generalization properties
against previously unseen types of attacks on the proposed
Aggregated database.
1. Introduction
Thankfully to the progress made in the development of
advanced learning paradigms, such as Deep-learning, the
recognition performance of facial biometric systems has re-
cently improved significantly even in fully unconstrained
environments [15, 17]. However presentation attacks (PA),
also known as spoofing attacks, pose additional challenges
on the path of wide deployment of biometric systems. Ac-
cording to recent research on vulnerability analysis of face
recognition systems [13, 16] the facial biometrics is not an
exclusion. In the scenario of face PA, an impostor tries to
present artificial sample representing biometric characteris-
tics of the face, with an intention to affect the normal opera-
tion of the biometric system. Typical face PAs are print and
replay attacks. However they are not limited to that, attack-
ers are getting more creative as new technologies appear.
Up to date, the most of research in the field of face pre-
sentation attack detection (PAD), was considering the task
as a two-class classification problem. In this scenario, sam-
ples of both bona-fide class (also called live or real sam-
ples) and the class of PAs are intensively collected, and
the two-class classifier is learned to predict the class of
the input samples. There is a lot of research done around
this fundamental idea, with some notable ideas introduced
in [6, 11, 12, 18]. The main focus has been on boosting
the anti-spoofing performance for databases with identical
types of attacks across both testing and evaluation subsets.
Despite many successes achieved up to now, this approach
has drawbacks. First, in realistic applications, spoofing at-
tacks may have a very diverse nature and most probably
are not present in the training stage. This diversity may be
caused by various reasons, for example, different replay de-
vices, environmental changes or novel types of attacks. As a
result, a space occupied by feature vectors coming from PA
class can potentially be broad. Thus, the decision boundary
of two-class classifier learned in the training stage might
fail to generalize in operation mode when unseen types of
attacks are presented.
The unpredictable nature of attacks poses a need to study,
and address if necessary, the generalization properties of
PAD systems under unseen types of attacks. In fact, some
researchers already highlighted, that face PAD systems us-
ing the two-class classification idea, are failing to general-
ize across both different datasets and unseen PAs. Authors
in [8] trained an LBP and SVM based face PAD systems
on the CASIA FASD [19], and tested on the Replay-Attack
database [6], and vice-versa. The increase of error rates by
at least 100% in all cases, has experimentally demonstrated
a poor generalization performance of the system. A broad
research on the topic was recently introduced in [4] and [3],
where authors test the robustness of 20 different PAD algo-
rithms against unseen types of attacks in both intra and inter
database experiments. Nearly all possible combinations of
types of attacks and datasets are tested within 3 selected
databases - Replay-Attack [6], MSU MFSD [18] and CA-
SIA FASD [19]. While one-class classifiers have been used
in the past in fingerprint [10] and speaker [1] spoof detec-
tion, to the best of our knowledge, [4] is the only paper
testing the applicability of one-class classifiers in the task
of face PAD. Authors clearly conclude, that, first, anomaly
detection based systems are not inferior compared with two-
class analogs. Second, neither one-class or two-class face
PAD systems perform well enough requiring more research
in this direction. However, the paper has some drawbacks,
first, the best performing anomaly detection based setup
in [4] is based on one-class SVM. In our, more challenging
experiments, we demonstrate relatively weak performance
of one-class SVM based algorithm, moreover, our proposed
GMM-base anomaly detector outperforms one-class SVM
by a large margin. Second disadvantage of [4] is the evalu-
ation methodology, all results are reported as an area under
the ROC curve without providing the ROC themselves. In
our proposed evaluation protocols, we stick to the method-
ology widely accepted by the research community, report-
ing bothHTERmaking the results comparable with legacy
systems, and DET curves introduced in ISO/IEC 30107− 3
standard.
Motivated by the discussions disclosed above, the cur-
rent work, first, demonstrates that nearly state-of-the-art
face PAD system using two-class classifier is failing to gen-
eralize against unseen types of attacks. Second, we pro-
pose an anomaly detection, or one-class classifier, based
face PAD system having a better generalization properties
against unseen types of PAs.
In order to support above statements, the following
main contributions are proposed in this work. First, to
demonstrate the generalization issues of two-class anti-
spoofing systems we introduce a new challenging Aggre-
gated database, which is composed of three publicly avail-
able face PAD databases, as well as develop appropriate
evaluation protocols for it. The protocols guarantee, that
types of attacks in the training and development sets are
not present in the evaluation set. Thus, the reported perfor-
mance is reflecting the behavior of the PAD system under
unseen attacks. The proposed Aggregated database unites
the data collection efforts of various institutions being a
composition of three publicly available datasets: Replay-
Attack [6], Replay-Mobile [7] and MSU MFSD [18]. As
will be demonstrated in the experimental section, the Ag-
gregated database is more challenging than any of its indi-
vidual components. Having a wider spectrum of both photo
and replay attacks, the database makes a step towards more
realistic evaluation scenario.
Second, we propose a face PAD system approaching pre-
sentation attack detection as anomaly detection, or a one-
class classification problem, using only bona-fide features
in the training stage. The system is built of Image Qual-
ity Measures (IQM), from [12] and [18], forming a fea-
ture space, and a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) trained
to represent the probability distribution of bona-fide sam-
ples. In the prediction step, both real and attack samples
are classified using this pre-trained GMM. Experiments on
the Aggregated database demonstrate a better generaliza-
tion properties of the introduced PAD algorithm against un-
seen types of attacks, as opposed to observed PA detectors
based on two-class classifiers. Researchers in [4] demon-
strate the comparable generalization performance against
unseen types of attacks for PAD systems based on one-class
and two-class SVMs. Our proposed system outperforms
the one-class SVM based by a large margin, which is ex-
amined in the experimental section. Additional motivating
point of anomaly detectors is the reduced amount of data re-
quired for training, hence consuming less effort in the data
collection stage. Finally, the results reported in this work
are fully reproducible: the publicly available databases are
used in experiments, the evaluation protocols are strictly
defined, and the source code for replicating experiments is
published1.
2. Proposed anomaly detection based face PAD
approach
This section briefly introduces the proposed anomaly de-
tection based face PAD algorithm. The main focus of the
proposed design is to have better generalization properties
against unseen types of attacks as opposed to the analogous
builds with two-class classifiers, which is proved experi-
mentally in Section 3. The system is composed of three
main blocks: a preprocessor, a feature extractor, and a one-
class classifier. The preprocessor is cropping and normal-
izing the faces in the input frames. The feature extractor
uses the IQM features introduced in [12] and [18]. The
classifier is a GMM based anomaly detector classifying the
features into bona-fide or attack classes. IQMs of [12]
and [18] has been selected as discriminative features in the
proposed PAD system being the best performing among ob-
served baseline algorithms. However, having successful,
domain-specific features is not sufficient for good gener-
1Code: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.pad.face
alization properties. These features were originally intro-
duced in combination with two-class classifiers to perform
detection of PAs. As demonstrated in the next section, orig-
inal setup doesn’t generalize well against unseen types of
attacks. We show, that anomaly detectors, or one-class clas-
sifiers, suit the needs better.
According to the taxonomy in [14] anomaly detectors
can be split into two groups: generative and non-generative.
Generative methods tend to model the distribution func-
tions of observations. The non-generative approaches are
learning the decision boundary grouping the normal obser-
vations.
Authors in [4] demonstrate the comparable effectiveness
of non-generative and two-class based method, specifically
one-class and two-class SVM, in the inter-database and un-
seen attack tests. In our experiments, employing a more
challenging Aggregated database as opposed to [4], one-
class SVM doesn’t perform well. On the other hand, our
proposed setup using one-class GMM, associated to genera-
tive methods, generalizes significantly better against unseen
types of attacks.
A Gaussian Mixture Model is a weighted sum ofK mul-
tivariate Gaussian distributions:
p(x|Θ) =
K∑
k=1
wkN (x;µk,Σk), (1)
where Θ = {wk, µk, σk}{k=1,...,K} are the weights, means
and the covariances parameterizing the GMM model. The
GMM is learned using the Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithm introduced in [9]. In the training it is assumed,
that each component in (1) has its own general covariance
matrix. The EM algorithm is a local optimization method.
Thus, the quality of the solution depends on the quality of
the initial values of the parameters. In our case, the ini-
tialization method is based on k-means to pre-cluster the
samples. It sets the means and covariances of the Gaussian
distributions to the values of means and covariances of each
k-means cluster, and also sets the prior probabilities to be
proportional to the mass of each cluster. In our case, GMM
is trained using IQM feature vectors of the bona-fide class
only. Once the training is completed, the final score of a
sample x, which in our case is the IQM vector, is computed
as follows:
score = log(p(x|Θ)) (2)
3. Experiments
This section covers details on the proposed Aggregated
database and evaluation protocols, following by experimen-
tal results for legacy face PAD systems, and the results for
the proposed anomaly detection based face PAD setup.
Number of clients 125
Number of videos 2510
Bona-fide videos 660
PA videos 1850
Video resolution
240× 320, 720× 1280,
640× 480, 720× 480
Print attacks A4 and A3 prints
Replay attacks
PC matte-screen, iPad Air, iPad 1st.,
iPhone 3GS, iPhone 5S
Protocols: number of real and attack (att.) videos
Set training develop. evaluation
Num. of clients 37 41 47
Video type real att. real att. real att.
grandtest 200 552 240 616 220 682
photo-photo-video 200 344 240 392 220 268
video-video-photo 200 208 240 224 220 414
Table 1. The main statistics of the proposed Aggregated database.
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Figure 1. Examples of attacks for databases used in the Aggregated
dataset. First column corresponds to bona-fide samples, PA I refers
to printed photo attacks, PA II is low quality video replay attacks,
and PA III corresponds to high quality video replay attacks.
3.1. Database and evaluation methodology
Subsection covers the introduced Aggregated database
and evaluation protocols, allowing to test face PAD systems
under unseen attack scenarios. Aggregated database is a
composition of three publicly available databases: Replay-
Attack [6], Replay-Mobile [7] and MSU MFSD [18], some
examples of bona-fide and attack images are displayed in
Figure 1. The training, development and evaluation sub-
sets of three forming databases are concatenated producing
same subsets of the Aggregated database. Note, the clients
in these subsets don’t overlap. The main statistics of the Ag-
gregated database is summarized in Table 1. Wide variety
of clients, capturing devices and types of attacks makes this
database among the largest and most challenging datasets
freely available for face PAD experiments. Moreover, using
HTER, %
Replay-
Attack
Replay-
Mobile
MSU
MFSD
Aggregated
database
LBP [6] 15.6 17.2 21.4 19.1
Motion [2] 13.2 10.4 17.1 43.0
IQM [12, 18] 4.6 4.1 4.9 15.3
Table 2.HTER for 3 types of features using two-class SVM with
RBF kernel; computed on the evaluation subset of 4 databases for
the grandtest protocol.
previously published and popular databases as aggregation
components as well as similar evaluation protocols, helps
researchers to intuitively position this database in the hi-
erarchy. With the database we introduce three evaluation
protocols, allowing evaluation of face PAD systems in the
scenario of unseen types of attacks. In particular the follow-
ing protocols have been developed:
• grandtest - following the legacy evaluation strategies,
in this protocol samples of all types of attacks are avail-
able in all subsets of the database: training, develop-
ment and evaluation.
• photo-photo-video - in this protocol only photo at-
tacks are available in the training and development
sets, and only video attacks are available in the eval-
uation set.
• video-video-photo - the opposite of the above: only
video attacks are available in the training and develop-
ment sets, and only photo attacks are available in the
evaluation set.
It is worth mentioning, that the category of photo PAs in-
cludes both printed facial photos and photos replayed with
screens. Training set is used for training the PAD system.
The threshold corresponding to the desired operation point
is selected on the development set. The evaluation set is
used to report the performance corresponding to the de-
termined threshold. Thus, in protocols photo-photo-video
and video-video-photo, the final performance is reported for
types of PAs unseen in the training and development stages.
For all protocols anomaly detectors are trained using
purely feature vectors of the bona-fide, or real class. The
two-class systems are trained with the data whichever avail-
able in the training set of the particular protocol. The soft-
ware for database querying is publicly available.
3.2. Results for baselines
In this subsection, some successful, previously pub-
lished face PAD systems are evaluated using three publicly
available databases: Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile, MSU
MFSD, as well as using proposed Aggregated database. In
this evaluation scenario all types of attacks are present in all
subsets of the databases, which corresponds to the grandtest
protocol available in all aforementioned databases. The
goal of these experiments is two-fold. First, the best per-
forming features will be selected for further tests in the
unseen attacks scenario, Section 3.3. Second, testing the
legacy systems on the Aggregated database helps to intu-
itively interpret the complexity of the proposed database.
The following systems are selected: LBP-based
from [6], Motion-based [2], and IQM-based where feature
vector of a frame is a concatenation of quality measures
introduced in [12] and [18]. For the sake of compatibil-
ity, the preprocessor and classifier are identical in all sys-
tems. Since biometric samples in all databases are videos,
the preprocessor extracts faces in all frames given annota-
tions defining facial region. The frames with a face smaller
than 50 × 50 pixels are discarded. The cropped images are
the then normalized to the identical size of 64 × 64 pixels.
In the case of LBP and Motion features, the facial images
are converted to gray-scale format, while IQM-based sys-
tem requires RGB images. In the LBP based system the
feature vectors are normalized LBP histograms composed
of uniform LBPu28,1 codes, identical to [6]. In the Motion-
based PAD [2], the feature vectors of the length 10 are com-
puted for each 20 non-overlapping frames. The IQM sys-
tem uses 139 quality measures, which is a concatenation of
IQMs introduced in [12] and [18]. In all cases the features
are classified using identical two-class SVM module with
RBF kernel. The score is the probability of a sample being
a real class. The evaluation of LBP and IQM based systems
is done on the frame-level, meaning that each frame in the
input video is a considered as a separate biometric sample.
The Motion-based PAD is evaluated on the window-level,
each window (20 frmaes) is an individual biometric sam-
ple.
The results for this sequence of experiments are intro-
duced in Table 2, reporting HTER on the evaluation sets
of the databases. The HTER is an average of BPCER
and APCER for the threshold, corresponding to EER op-
eration point on the development set in this work. The no-
tations APCER - Attack Presentation Classification Error
Rate and BPCER - Bona-fide Presentation Classification
Error Rate are introduced in ISO/IEC 30107 − 3 standard
and are similar to FAR and FRR, respectively.
Under identical preprocessor and classifier instances,
IQM clearly outperform other types of features. Moreover,
one can notice, that the proposed Aggregated database is the
most challenging one.
3.3. Results for the proposed PAD system
Following the findings from previous experiment, the
generalization properties of one-class and two-class PAD
systems under unseen types of attacks are studied here, us-
ing best performing IQM features and most challenging Ag-
gregated database as an evaluation basis. The following
one-class classifiers are tested: one-class GMM, which cor-
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Figure 2. DET curves - development set of the grandtest protocol
of the Aggregated database. Four types of classifiers applied to
IQM features of the facial region.
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Figure 3. DET curves - evaluation set of the grandtest protocol of
the Aggregated database. Four types of classifiers applied to IQM
features of the facial region.
responds to generative methods [14], and one-class SVM
with RBF kernel, which is a non-generative method [14].
For one-class GMM the output score is a weighted log-
probability, for one-class SVM the output is a confidence
score as returned by LIBSVM [5]. In the case of one-class
GMM the number of clusters is set to K = 50, further aug-
mentation of K gives no significant gain in performance.
All one-class or anomaly detection systems are trained us-
ing only bona-fide samples of the training set. Among two-
class classifiers a Logistic Regression (LR) and SVM with
RBF kernel are evaluated. For both classifiers, the output
score is a probability of a sample being a real class. The
two-class systems are trained using real and attack samples
of the training set.
First, all classifiers are evaluated using ”grandtest” pro-
tocol of the Aggregated database, corresponding to the sce-
nario when all types of attacks are present among all sub-
set of the database. The EER, HTER values are summa-
rized in Table 3, with DET curves given in Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 4. DET curves - development set of the photo-photo-video
protocol of the Aggregated database. Four types of classifiers ap-
plied to IQM features of the facial region.
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Figure 5. DET curves - evaluation set of the photo-photo-video
protocol of the Aggregated database. Four types of classifiers ap-
plied to IQM features of the facial region.
As one can notice, two-class based systems in general per-
form better. Only for low APCER values the performance
of one-class GMM is on par with two-class systems, Fig-
ures 2, 3.
Next, the experiments using ”photo-photo-video” and
”video-video-photo” protocols are accumulated, address-
ing the case of unseen types of attacks in the evaluation
set. For the development set, Figures 4 and 6, containing
the same types of attacks as in the training step, the per-
formance of two-class approaches is superior in compari-
son with anomaly detectors. However, in the evaluation
set with unseen types of attacks, Figures 5 and 7, the op-
posite behavior can be observed - one-class GMM outper-
forms two-class methods in a wide range of APCER val-
ues. Moreover, the relations of EER and HTER values
are more stable for one-class systems as opposed to two-
class approaches, Table 3. For ”photo-photo-video” proto-
col theHTER values even go down compared to EER for
both one-class SVM and GMM. This demonstrates a bet-
Protocol grandtest photo-photo-video video-video-photo
Subset ”dev” ”eval” ”dev” ”eval” ”dev” ”eval”
Error, % EER HTER EER HTER EER HTER
A
lg
or
ith
m one-class GMM 19.3 20.8 22.1 14.5 13.5 29.8
one-class SVM 28.1 34.8 35.5 24.3 18.2 39.5
two-class LR 10.3 11.9 10.2 30.1 1.5 30.3
two-class SVM 12.7 15.3 10.5 21.9 1.4 24.9
Table 3. EER, computed on development - ”dev” set, and HTER, computed on evaluation ”eval” set, values for various protocols of the
Aggregated database. Best HTER per protocol is highlighted in bold.
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Figure 6. DET curves - development set of the video-video-photo
protocol of the Aggregated database. Four types of classifiers ap-
plied to IQM features of the facial region.
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Figure 7. DET curves - evaluation set of the video-video-photo
protocol of the Aggregated database. Four types of classifiers ap-
plied to IQM features of the facial region.
ter generalization properties of anomaly detectors against
unseen types of attacks, which is a desirable feature in real-
istic scenarios of operation of facial PAD systems. Interest-
ingly, that the best performing in the ”grandtest” protocol,
two-class LR classifier has the worst generalization proper-
ties against unseen types of attacks. This can be concluded
from both high HTER values, Table 3, and significant er-
ror growth in DET curves, Figures 5 and 7.
4. Conclusion
This paper addresses a problem of face anti-spoofing as
an anomaly detection task. The work is motivated by the po-
tentially wide diversity of spoofing attacks in realistic appli-
cations, and generalization issues specific to current nearly
state-of-the-art PA detectors in the tests presenting unseen
spoofs. Up to date, most of the research in the field was
considering face PAD as a two-class classification problem:
bona-fide samples versus attacks. To highlight the stated
generalization issues we propose a new evaluation protocols
designed to study the PAD algorithms under unseen attacks
scenario. The protocols are made for introduced Aggre-
gated database, which is composed of three publicly avail-
able sets: Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile and MSU MFSD.
Aggregated database unites the data collection efforts of
various institutions making it a more challenging set, than
any of its standalone components. It contains a wide vari-
ety of photo and replay attacks making a step towards more
realistic evaluation scenario.
The lowest HTER = 11.9% for the grandtest protocol
of the Aggregated database, among legacy systems based on
two-class classifier, was obtained using IQM [12, 18] fea-
tures and Logistic Regression. However, we then demon-
strate poor generalization properties of this setup against
unseen types of spoofs, giving 30.1% and 30.3% HTER
for the photo-photo-video and video-video-photo protocols
of the Aggregated set. Moreover, the performance of the
system drops significantly for lower APCER values, which
is a desirable operation diapason in realistic applications.
In contrast, our proposed IQM and one-class GMM
based PA detector generalizes better for photo-photo-
video and video-video-photo protocols of the Aggregated
database. The GMM anomaly detector is trained using only
bona-fide samples present in the training set. The IQM-
GMM system outperforms all other observed combinations
in the wide range of APCER values. Only in the high
APCER region, which is usually not of interest in realistic
applications, the performance of two-class systems getting
comparable with the proposed setup. Generally, though, it
can be concluded that neither of the observed systems per-
form well enough in the proposed evaluation scenario, and
there is a clear need to continue research in this direction.
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